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Imagination: 
A Sine Qua Non of Science
MICHAEL T. STUART
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science
London School of Economics, UK
What role does the imagination play in scientifi c progress? After examin-
ing several studies in cognitive science, I argue that one thing the imagi-
nation does is help to increase scientifi c understanding, which is itself 
indispensable for scientifi c progress. Then, I sketch a transcendental jus-
tifi cation of the role of imagination in this process.
Keywords: Imagination, understanding, thought experiments, sci-
entifi c progress, schema, problem of coordination.
Blaise Pascal called the imagination that “deceitful part in man, that 
mistress of error and falsity.” He said it was “all-powerful,” and the 
“enemy of reason.” Malebranche referred to imagination as the “mad-
woman in the house,” and many fi ctional and historical catastrophes 
can indeed cite specifi c over-active imaginations at their roots. It is 
imagination that leads Goethe’s young Werther to his infamous sor-
rows, and it is behind the ambition of Macbeth. Chapter eleven of Mein 
Kampf provides an actual and far more horrifying instance of the imag-
ination being used to justify evil actions. According to George Orwell, 
Hitler saw himself as “the martyr, the victim, Prometheus chained to 
the rock, the self-sacrifi cing hero who fi ghts single-handed against im-
possible odds. If he were killing a mouse he would know how to make it 
seem like a dragon” (Orwell 1940).
Yet, to reverse the sexist skepticism of Pascal and Malebranche, 
without imagination we could have no goals, no ethics, no knowledge. 
In the refl ections of scientists we see tribute paid to the imagination 
quite regularly. Francis Jacob, a Nobel Prize winning biologist, recent-
ly wrote:
It was not a simple accumulation of facts that led Newton, in his mother’s 
garden one day, suddenly to see the moon as a ball thrown far enough to fall 
exactly at the speed of the horizon, all around the earth. Or that led Planck 
to compare the radiation of heat to a hail of quanta. Or William Harvey to 
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see in the bared heart of a fi sh the thudding of a mechanical pump. In each 
case they perceived an analogy unnoticed up till then. As Arthur Koestler 
pointed out, everything in this way of thinking seems different from that of 
King Solomon when he compares the beasts of his beloved Shulamite to a 
pair of fawns, or that of Shakespeare’s Macbeth, when he sees life as “a tale 
told by an idiot, full of sound and fury.” And yet, despite the very different 
means of expression used by the poet and the scientist, imagination works 
in the same way. It is often the idea of a new metaphor that guides the sci-
entist. An object, an event, is suddenly perceived in an unusual and reveal-
ing light, as if someone abruptly tore off a veil that, till then, had covered 
our eyes. (Jacob 2001: 119) 
Jacob reminds us that no agglomeration of facts can give us the power 
over nature that science seeks, or the beauty and novelty of art. Dustin 
Stokes (2014) argues that even if Bach had known all there was to 
know about musical relationships, this still would not have been suffi -
cient to compose The Well-Tempered Clavier (159–160). This resonates 
with Jacob’s claim above; whatever is going on in scientifi c discovery, 
it is not merely the collection of facts. Other Nobel Prize winning sci-
entists gesture to similar senses of imaginative artistry and its neces-
sity in their work (e.g. Einstein 1931, 97, 1934, 163; c.f. Holton 1996, 
Hadamard 1996).
However, it was common in the philosophy of science for a long time 
to hold that the imagination was not epistemologically relevant other 
than in the context of discovery. Partially thanks to the growing infl u-
ence of science studies since the 1960s, many philosophers and cogni-
tive scientists have reversed this trend, and now see the imagination as 
an important factor in the production of knowledge and other epistemo-
logical desiderata. One reason for this change was the dissolution of an 
absolute distinction between the contexts of discovery and justifi cation. 
Another is the recently emphasized role of the imagination in scientifi c 
thought experiments. René van Woudenberg, in his introduction to a 
special issue of Metaphilosophy on thought experiments, claims that 
“the imagination, perhaps surprisingly, plays an important role in the 
process of obtaining knowledge: knowledge of certain normative issues, 
of possibilities, of moral truths, of certain physical matters, of one’s 
self, and more” (van Woudenberg 2006: 160; see also Byrne 2005, Cur-
rie and Ravenscroft 2002, Kind 2016, Kind and Kung 2016, McGinn 
2004, Salis and Frigg forthcoming, Stuart et al. 2017).
To support such a claim, some philosophers have argued that be-
cause normative, modal and ethical truths are not accessible to em-
pirical investigation, they must be the result of mental investigation 
(whether rational, as in Brown 2012, or naturalistic as in Nersessian 
2007 or Miščević 2007). Considering possible worlds is one way the 
imagination might play a role in the divination of such truths. For ex-
ample, the imagination is crucial in making the inference from conceiv-
ability to possibility, which is attacked and defended as a means (or 
mere guide) to modal knowledge (see Gendler and Hawthorne 2002).
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I would like to look again at the epistemological role of the imagi-
nation in science, specifi cally through the use of thought experiments. 
Assuming that thought experiments play some role in scientifi c prog-
ress, I want to fi nd out the nature of that role, and the nature of the 
epistemic good produced. To do this, I am going to present some results 
from cognitive science that ask what scientists and students of science 
learn from thought experiments, and how.
One problem with discussing the role of the imagination is that cog-
nitive science studies rarely refer to the imagination in a general way. 
Instead they refer to mental images, analogy, metaphor, counterfac-
tual reasoning, mental models, and so on. We fi nd something similar 
in mainstream analytic philosophy, which deals with the imagination 
as something that tests modal propositions by seeing whether they are 
conceivable, or produces psychological states which obey special norms, 
and much else. (See Gendler 2013 for a sample of ways philosophers 
characterize imagination). In order to connect empirical and epistemo-
logical issues, then, I maintain an inclusive reading of the imagination, 
delimiting not much more than the mental ability to interact cognitive-
ly with things that are not now present via the senses. These cognitive 
interactions need not be propositional or static (like images), and to al-
low conceptual space for rationalism, their content need not consist en-
tirely of permutations of previous experience. If we like, we could add 
the requirement that the cognitive interactions depart from the truth 
(following Stokes 2014), which is a reasonable requirement if we want 
to defi ne the sort of imagination that goes into creating something truly 
novel, but I do not think it is necessary at this level of investigation. 
Imagining a Boeing 747 at the bottom of the Mariana trench is no less 
an imagining if there is in fact a Boeing 747 there.
One preliminary conclusion after looking at results in cognitive 
science is that an important and mostly overlooked use of scientifi c 
thought experiments is to create understanding as opposed to knowl-
edge. Even though explaining how thought experiments increase scien-
tifi c understanding would partially address the “primary philosophical 
challenge” of thought experiments (see Brown and Fehige 2011), many 
writers focus on the ability of thought experiments to provide new 
knowledge, empirical evidence or empirical information. Still, increas-
ing understanding is just as epistemologically interesting as providing 
new knowledge, and in the second half of this paper I will investigate 
this use of thought experiments.
Let us now turn to results in cognitive science. Kosem and Özdemir 
have recently claimed that imagination “is an indispensible component 
of scientifi c reasoning” (2014: 887), and many others agree (e.g., Brown 
2006; Clement 1993, 2008, 2009; Gilbert and Reiner 2000; Klassen 
2006, Lattery 2001; Reiner and Burko 2003; Reiner and Gilbert 2004). 
Still, it is not immediately obvious how we should go about investi-
gating scientifi c imagination. One way is to consider historical cases. 
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Stephens and Clement (2012) argue that even though such an exercise 
may be helpful, it is not enough to discern the cognitive mechanisms 
that underlie imagistic mental reasoning of the type we fi nd in scien-
tifi c thought experiments. They write:
It is diffi cult to analyse the mental processes that allow a scientist to gen-
erate and run a thought experiment during an investigation by using his-
torical data because the original thought process can easily be buried under 
many changes and refi nements the author carries out before publishing a 
thought experiment. Also, for many thought experiments it is hard to know 
whether they were originally part of a discovery process or created after the 
investigation to convince others. (Stephens and Clement 2012: 160) 
Historical details can only take us so far; we must also study thinking 
agents in real-time. I will summarize the results of several such studies 
here. First I will look at studies done on thought experiments in science 
education, and then I will consider studies of the way thought experi-
ments are spontaneously invented in scientifi c problem-solving, both 
by students and experts.
Reiner and Gilbert (2000) discuss thought experiments in textbooks 
by fi rst cataloguing which thought experiments appear where, and for 
what purpose. Then they compare the original and textbook presenta-
tions of famous thought experiments. They conclude that thought ex-
periments help students and scientists understand scientifi c concepts. 
What does it mean for a thought experiment to help us understand 
something? They cite Stephen Toulmin (1972) who explicates under-
standing a concept in terms of being able to use it. A concept of any 
kind is capable of use, and therefore understood, if two criteria are 
met: it is meaningful, in that the user knows what it means; and it is 
fruitful, in that it enables the user to achieve a goal or to identify new 
possibilities. (For an extended discussion of these criteria as evidence 
of the achievement of understanding in science, see Stuart 2016).
I highlight this characterization of understanding because most of 
the below-mentioned studies are easily brought under its framework 
– especially if we include not just concepts but what can be called theo-
retical structures, a term I use to refer to concepts, models, theories, 
principles, laws, etc. Scientists and their students must be able to use 
new theoretical structures, otherwise they serve no purpose. And one 
cannot use a structure without knowing what it means, or in other 
words, without the structure being meaingful. Meaningfulness is not 
always so easy to achieve, especially in science, and we will see that 
thought experiments can sometimes assist in affording this desidera-
tum. Also, if one understands a theoretical structure, one can usually 
achieve something with it. Thought experiments help us explore the 
consequences of adopting certain structures, and see how conceptual-
ized phenomena interrelate, and this opens up new possibilities for 
theorizing, modeling, and constructing experiments.
Building on this framework, Reiner and Gilbert argue that thought 
experiments in science textbooks (as opposed to those in scientifi c jour-
CEEOL copyright 2017
CEEOL copyright 2017
 M.T. Stuart, Imagination: A Sine Qua Non of Science 13
nals), are not used as effectively as they could be. In scientifi c litera-
ture, most thought experiments are presented in the following way: We 
begin with a scenario or problem-statement. We create an imaginary 
world to help us explore the scenario or problem. We “set up” or “design” 
a thought experiment in this imaginary world, which we then “run” 
and “observe.” Finally, we draw a conclusion about the initial problem 
or scenario. This presentation-style spurs members of its audience to 
make new connections on their own. Textbooks, on the other hand, of-
ten present the conclusion of the thought experiment fi rst, and then 
the imagined scenario is introduced, which lends credence to the con-
clusion. In this style of presentation, students do not vary variables in 
their minds; they simply follow along a text (Reiner and Gilbert 2000). 
This is suboptimal for achieving the conditions of meaningfulness and 
fruitfulness. If you do not perform the thought experiment or otherwise 
establish the semantic connections for yourself, a theoretical structure 
will have diminished meaning for you. It is also less likely that you will 
see all the ways to make the structure fruitful. (For other ways of mak-
ing theoretical structures meaningful and fruitful see Stuart 2017).
Velentzas, Halkia and Skordoulis (2007) look at textbooks as well, 
and they show that what James R. Brown calls “constructive” thought 
experiments (Brown 1991: 36), i.e., those that provide evidence for or 
establish a theory, are preferred by textbook authors to what Brown 
calls “destructive” thought experiments (Brown 1991: 34), which func-
tion as counterexamples. The thought experiments used most com-
monly in physics textbooks are Einstein’s train, Einstein’s Elevator, 
and Heisenberg’s Microscope, which the authors classify as construc-
tive. Perhaps these are so popular because thought experiments like 
these show students how their everyday experiences relate to modern 
day physical theory (Velentzas, Halkia and Skordoulis 2007: 365ff.). In 
other words, such thought experiments might “build bridges between 
students’ knowledge and everyday experience and the new or modifi ed 
concepts and principles which have to be learned” (359). Building such 
bridges would certainly help to make new concepts meaningful and 
fruitful for students.
This study inspires several more by Velentzas and Halkia. In the 
fi rst (2011), they discuss Heisenberg’s Microscope “as an example of 
using thought experiments in teaching physics theories to students.” 
They begin by citing Alexander Koyré, who claims that thought experi-
ments “help scientists to bridge the gap between empirical facts and 
theoretical concepts” (Koyré 1968). Agreeing, they argue that while 
Heisenberg’s microscope thought experiment is not generally well re-
garded by physicists (either at Heisenberg’s time or now), the thought 
experiment is still quite useful for introducing the uncertainty prin-
ciple in quantum mechanics, which they taught to 40 high school stu-
dents in grade 11 using the thought experiment. First, they introduced 
some important concepts from quantum mechanics, and then let the 
students work through the thought experiment mostly on their own. 
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That is, through Socratic question and answer, the students were al-
lowed to work through their guesses, and if they went too far off track, 
they were gently guided back. Velentzas and Halkia recorded the ses-
sions in order to code and analyze them, and two weeks later admin-
istered a test for comprehension. They concluded that many students 
did come to understand the uncertainty principle from the thought ex-
periment. And not merely for the case of gamma rays and microscopes; 
they appreciated the principle independently of any considerations of 
specifi c measuring apparatuses.
Next they turned to special and general relativity (2013a). Again 
the authors found that thought experiments in relativity make it pos-
sible for students to “grasp physical laws and principles which demand 
a high degree of abstract thinking, such as the principle of equivalence 
and the consequences of the constancy of the speed of light to concepts 
of time and space” (3026). They found this achievement more surpris-
ing than in the case of the uncertainty principle, because students have 
very strong folk intuitions which interfere with understanding General 
relativity theory. Students generally did not understand the concept of 
inertia and they assumed that their intuitive concept of simultaneity 
could not be wrong, that space is empty and separate from time, and 
that an observer’s point of view has no bearing on physical laws as 
there is always an encompassing frame from which an objective state 
can be observed (Arriassecq and Greca 2012).
However the authors did manage to convey the concepts of rela-
tivity theory to the students successfully, letting them work through 
Einstein’s elevator and train. They recorded the sessions and analyzed 
them, and then administered a test two weeks later for comprehension. 
From their success they concluded that thought experiments are used 
“both for clarifying the consequences of physics theories and for bridg-
ing the gap between the abstract concepts inherent in the theories and 
everyday life experiences” (3027). Finally, in their (2013b) the authors 
turned to Newton’s Cannon. As in the above two cases, the authors got a 
group of students to work through the thought experiment on their own, 
and to see that projectile motion and orbital motion are governed by the 
same laws. The authors claim that Newton’s thought experiment “can 
act as a bridge which enables students to correlate the idea of the ‘down-
ward’ motion of objects drawn from their everyday experience with the 
same objects’ motion ‘to the center of the Earth’” (2623). To make this 
possible, students had to see the Earth as if from above, and extend 
their knowledge of regular projectile motion to a scale large enough to 
represent both suborbital and orbital motion. This allowed them “to link 
the motion of a projectile as it can be observed in everyday situations 
with the possible case of a projectile that can move continuously paral-
lel to the ground in a context where the whole Earth is visible” (2623).
The metaphor of “bridging” is common to all of these studies, and 
continues to be invoked below. I think it is signifi cant because it relates 
to both meaningfulness and fruitfulness. When a bridge opens, new ter-
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ritory becomes accessible. The territory was already there, but we did 
not have access to it. A theoretical structure is not made fruitful by a 
thought experiment if that thought experiment does not make possible 
new and identifi able uses of the structure, and one way it might do this 
is by connecting the theoretical structure via “bridges” to existing con-
cepts, background theoretical knowledge, experiences and skills. Such 
activity can also provide semantic content to the theoretical structure, 
rendering it (more) meaningful.
Velentzas and Halkia conclude that thought experiments are useful 
in education because they help students learn to apply diffi cult scientif-
ic concepts. But there are two other interesting conclusions they draw 
in their (2013b). One is that thought experiments are pedagogically 
superior to computer simulations, because only in a thought experi-
ment is it completely up to the student to determine how the outcome 
of an imagined scenario results from the set-up. A computer simulation 
where the earth is seen from above and the student can program in dif-
ferent projectile velocities and see how these changes affect the motion 
of a projectile was useful, and certainly better than merely calculating 
consequences of Newton’s laws. But in these cases the student takes 
a passive role by setting the parameters and waiting to see what hap-
pens. In a thought experiment, students mentally “set” the parameters, 
and then in addition have to fi gure out what will happen. And instead 
of trusting to the algorithms of a computer, students must provide 
some reason to believe the system will evolve as it does in their imagi-
nations. Also, talking through imaginary scenarios enables teachers to 
see where a student stands with respect to their comprehension of the 
theory. Therefore the authors conclude that there is good evidence that 
thought experiments will not be replaced by computer simulations in 
the near future, at least in the classroom.
This is related to their second important conclusion, that “in any 
experiment, the manipulation of ideas is more important than the ma-
nipulation of materials” (2638). That is, “hands on is less important 
as compared to minds on” (Duit and Tesch 2010). Presumably the au-
thors mean that manipulating laboratory equipment is pedagogically 
less useful to a student who does not grasp the deeper meaning behind 
these events. And with respect to the goal of increasing scientifi c un-
derstanding, this is something worth stressing.
Now that we have discussed some of the fi ndings of thought ex-
periments in science education, let us look at how thought experiments 
originate in situ.
In “The Symbiotic Roles of Empirical Experimentation and Thought 
Experimentation in the Learning of Physics,” Reiner and Gilbert ar-
gue that in the course of solving empirical problems, subjects often 
construct and run thought experiments spontaneously. They conclude 
that “the process of alternating between these two modes—empirically 
experimenting and experimenting in thought—leads towards a con-
CEEOL copyright 2017
CEEOL copyright 2017
16 M.T. Stuart, Imagination: A Sine Qua Non of Science
vergence on scientifi cally acceptable concepts” (2004: 1819). In other 
words, thought and empirical experiments appear in conjunction, and 
this is for the best, because together they enable us to go from “seeing” 
a physical phenomenon to “knowing” about it (1820). The evidence for 
this is the following.
Reiner and Gilbert asked students to analyze a physical mechanism 
that behaved in an unexpected way. Two heavy wheels were set next 
to one another into a base, and each was free to spin. If one was made 
to spin quickly, the other would do nothing. But as it slowed down, 
the other would begin to spin and speed up, until the fi rst came to a 
complete stop. When the second wheel began to slow down, the fi rst 
would start spinning again. The reason for this behaviour was a set of 
hidden magnets contained in the wheels. Given a list of the materials 
out of which the mechanism was built, the students were asked to fi g-
ure out what was going on. Different sets of students were all observed 
to follow a similar methodology: they began by identifying the various 
physical mechanisms in a general way using concepts like force, accel-
eration, weight, direction, and so on. They used these to construct vari-
ous (mental or physical) models to capture what they observed. Then 
they abstracted their models further into what the authors called a 
“representational space,” where the relationships between features of 
the mechanism were represented, often with the help of pen and paper. 
Finally, the students created and used imaginary worlds to test their 
models using thought experiments.
The authors claim that instances like these show “how concepts 
emerge out of touching and seeing. A student forges links between the 
bodily and the mental, between the physical and the cognitive, facul-
ties” (2004: 1831). Despite the reference to knowledge, the epistemolog-
ical state in question is better described as understanding. Most of the 
knowledge discussed in traditional epistemology is propositional. And 
links between bodily, mental, physical and cognitive faculties, while 
they can be expressed in propositions, are not propositions themselves. 
Also, establishing connections between parts of theory and experience 
is typically referred to as “objectual understanding,” which is grasp-
ing the “coherence-making relationships” in a comprehensive body of 
information (Kvanvig 2003: 192). And it can be produced by thought 
experiments (Stuart 2017).
In a different study, Kösem and Özdemir (2014) collected three 
groups of subjects, each with a different level of expertise in physics, 
and presented them with diffi cult problems drawn from dynamics or 
mechanics. The fi rst group was made up of doctoral graduates, the sec-
ond was university undergraduates, and the third was high school stu-
dents in grade 12. The total number of thought experiments invented 
by each of the three groups was roughly equal.
In terms of the means of the thought experiments, each student ei-
ther modifi ed an object in an imaginary scenario (for example, the size 
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of a car), or a variable (its velocity). When they modifi ed the object, they 
did so either to match a more familiar case with which they had previ-
ous experience, or a simpler case, for example, by dissecting a problem 
into several smaller, easier problems. When they modifi ed a variable, 
they either eliminated or minimized the variable’s value to eliminate 
its infl uence altogether, which helped them focus on the relationships 
of other variables, or they increased the value of a variable to make its 
effect on the system more obvious.
In general, changing the problem to a more familiar case by modify-
ing the object was the most common type of thought experiment strat-
egy used by the undergraduate and high school groups. Modifying the 
variables was used quite often by the doctoral group, and very seldom 
by the others. In terms of purpose, there were several. Sometimes a sub-
ject would have an intuition, which they explored with a thought experi-
ment. This use was labelled “prediction.” Other times a subject might 
have an independent reason for believing something, which they chose 
to illuminate with a thought experiment while trying to report or justify 
it. This was labelled “explanation.” Other times the thought experiment 
played the role of a proof. The undergraduates used thought experi-
ments as a proof more than any of the other groups. The high school 
students and doctoral graduates very rarely used thought experiments 
as proof. Across all three groups, however, by far, “the most frequently 
observed purpose of using a thought experiment is for ‘explanation’” 
(882). That is, “to communicate ideas, or exemplify the solution” (879).
Finally, there are studies focused on the use of imagination by expert 
scientists in vivo. First, Trafton, Trickett and Minz (2005) ask if scien-
tists use the imagination to manipulate mental representations. They 
conclude that they do. They argue that scientists create what Clement 
later calls “overlay simulations” (2009) between external and mental 
representations. That is, they compare and align mental and exter-
nal representations, checking for fi t or feature-similarity. The authors 
found that the scientists manipulated spatial representations more of-
ten in their heads than they did using their computers (2005: 97).
In a second study, Trickett and Trafton (2007) built on these re-
sults, arguing that scientists spontaneously invent “small-scale” or “lo-
cal” thought experiments (867) in times of “informational uncertainty” 
(843). Scientists perform thought experiments in such conditions to 
“develop a general, or high-level, understanding of a system” (844). 
The authors focus on the data analysis phase of research, in which 
scientists must negotiate uncertainty to see what information the data 
presents, and interpret it. Employing “what if” reasoning helps scien-
tists test out alternate interpretations of the facts, fi ll in holes in their 
data, and see how their data fi t with existing research questions and 
background theories. They predict that thought experiments “will be 
used by experts when they are working either outside their immedi-
ate area of expertise or on their own cutting edge research—that is, in 
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situations that go beyond the limits of their current knowledge” (867; 
cf. Corcilius 2017 who argues that this is (roughly) how Aristotle used 
thought experiments)).
If the empirical results I have mentioned are on the right track, 
there is a great deal that is philosophically interesting here. In almost 
every one of the above studies, one of the main conclusions is that 
thought experiments are important because they bridge conceptual/
theoretical knowledge to previous experience, existing knowledge and 
abilities.
What does this tell us about the epistemological role of thought 
experiments in science? If we separate the action of bridging existing 
instances of knowledge from the action of creating new instances of 
knowledge, we see that thought experiments are often instances of the 
fi rst kind of action, whether or not they are instances of the second. 
Thought experiments are more often used to explore or interpret con-
ceptual solutions to problems, communicate ideas, or model scenarios, 
than they are to provide solutions to problems. That is to say, the per-
formance of a thought experiment usually increases understanding 
rather than producing new knowledge. In fact, Özdemir (2009) argues 
that students learn to shy away from using thought experiments as evi-
dence in physics as they mature, although they do not shy away from 
using them to communicate and explore. It is possible that this trend 
maintains itself in the professional careers of scientists everywhere.
It is also important that all of the above studies produce results that 
support the idea that thought experiments create understanding in one 
of the two ways mentioned at the start. Velentzas and Halkia showed 
that students use thought experiments to bridge empirical knowledge 
and theoretical structures. Gilbert and Reiner saw a symbiotic rela-
tionship between thought and empirical experiments, which were per-
formed in a way that “negotiated concepts” through communication 
and exploration, making a student’s concepts and models intelligible 
to him or herself, and also to his or her peers. Stephens and Clement 
argued that thought experiments “appear to have considerable value 
as a sense-making strategy” (2006: 1). Kosem and Özdemir found that 
the most common use of thought experiments across different groups 
was to “communicate ideas or exemplify a solution.” Trafton, Trickett 
and Mintz found scientists employing thought experiments to compare, 
align and manipulate representations, especially for communication. 
For each of these cases, the value of sense-making thought experiments 
derives at least partially from the fact that if we do not make sense of 
a theoretical structure we cannot make use of it.
Let us turn to some considerations of these results. First, these 
roles that we have just identifi ed are epistemological. And since these 
roles produce understanding as opposed to knowledge, we are able to 
draw on the quickly expanding resources in the philosophy of under-
standing. Understanding, like imagination, was rejected as a topic of 
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serious study in the philosophy of science around the time of the logical 
positivists, because it was associated with a psychological and subjec-
tive feeling (especially by Hempel; see de Regt et al 2009: 3–5; de Regt 
2009: 22–24). This feeling might be an outcome of good science and 
provide clues concerning what should be investigated next (see Lipton 
2009, Grimm 2009, Thagard and Stewart 2011), but it might also be 
irrelevant or misleading (see Ylikoski 2009). Leaving the positivist- era 
characterization behind, philosophers now consider understanding in 
many different senses.
As with “thought experiment,” a vague but useful term, we can say 
interesting things to differentiate understanding from other epistemo-
logical states in the absence of a necessary and suffi cient defi nition. 
One kind of understanding is “mediated,” that is, it comes by means of 
a model, an experiment, a theory, a thought experiment, an explana-
tion, or something else. One way to know if such mediating entities 
provide increased understanding is to ask about abilities. When we un-
derstand something, we can use it in new ways. We can relate what is 
understood to new and old knowledge, and to abilities we already had. 
This is why I continuously return to the meaningfulness and fruitful-
ness of theoretical structures. If we look at the thought experiments 
used in the aforementioned studies and in the history of science, we see 
that very many make some concept(s) more meaningful and fruitful, 
and so increase (evidence of) understanding. In Stuart (2016) I showed 
that Maxwell’s demon, Darwin’s eye, and the clock-in-the-box all pro-
vide this sort of understanding by connecting theoretical structures to 
experience, existing knowledge or abilities. Others try and fail, includ-
ing Heisenberg’s microscope and Darwin’s whale. I think we can extend 
the argument easily to many other thought experiments including Ein-
stein’s elevator and train, EPR, Galileo’s falling bodies, and Stevin’s 
prism. If thought experiments perform this function, this is no obstacle 
to their also serving as evidence for or against theoretical claims. That 
is, they could provide both understanding and knowledge, although it 
is understanding I am interested in here. How might thought experi-
ments provide both knowledge and understanding?
First, I hope it is clear that the same thought experiment can have 
several different uses at different times or for different people. For 
example, Schrödinger’s cat was once used to attack the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, and now it is used to introduce 
physics students to superposition and entanglement. One might argue 
that we have here two different thought experiments, but it is the same 
imagined scenario drawing on similar underlying assumptions, even 
if it is used for a different purpose in the two cases. If it is the same 
thought experiment, then the same thought experiment is at one time 
used by experts as an argument against a theory, and later by teachers 
and students for pedagogical reasons (see Bokulich and Frappier 2017 
for more on the identify conditions of thought experiments). Now, is 
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it possible that the same thought experiment can play more than one 
epistemic role, for the same person (or community), at the same time?
Yes: thought experiments like Heisenberg’s microscope, Schro-
dinger’s cat, Einstein’s elevator and others, are simultaneously used by 
scientists to make sense of diffi cult new theoretical structures, which 
increases their scientifi c understanding by helping them connect ab-
stract theoretical structures either to experience or to previously un-
connected parts of theory. In addition to serving this purpose, many 
of these thought experiments simultaneously or derivatively use this 
new understanding to attack, subvert, popularize or explain a theory or 
theoretical interpretation. The application of new understanding often 
results in new knowledge.
There is a complementary idea present in the work of Hans Radder 
on laboratory experiments (1996), which Sören Häggqvist (1996) and 
Tim de Mey (2003) applied to thought experiments. The idea is that 
the performance of an experiment is different from the application of 
the result of that experiment to theory. These two actions are often 
confl ated in general discussions of scientifi c experiments. What I am 
suggesting is that sometimes the performance of a good thought experi-
ment yields understanding, while the application of the result of that 
experiment yields knowledge.
What is novel here is that thought experiments are quite frequently 
signifi cant for scientifi c understanding and not merely for knowledge. 
This idea has some nice consequences. For instance, it explains why 
many of the more famous thought experiments appeared in the later 
stages of their respective scientifi c revolutions. This is because they were 
meant to make sense of a new theoretical structure that had been intro-
duced during the course of the revolution. If this is the case, the thought 
experiment could not have shown up earlier. The new quantum formal-
ism was mathematically complete and empirically adequate by 1925, 
and Schrödinger’s cat was not born until a decade later. Similar relation-
ships obtain between Maxwell’s demon and the statistical-mechanical 
interpretation of heat, Einstein’s train and general relativity, the clock 
in the box and quantum mechanics, and many others.
This idea also helps to explain the role of thought experiments in the 
rhetoric of science. If you can provide an intuitive interpretation of a 
theory, this can be a way to get others to accept that interpretation, and 
therewith, the theory. If I am convinced of the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics, it is necessary that I am also convinced of 
quantum mechanics. Likewise, for those who oppose a new and compet-
ing theory, the fi rst reaction is often to look for counterexamples, cases 
where the theory does not apply or that the theory cannot explain. And 
searching for counterexamples is itself an attempt to explore the con-
nection between the new theory and the world (i.e., gain understanding 
of the theory's empirical content), and show that the proposed connec-
tion cannot be made (i.e., gain knowledge through falsifi cation).
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This also explains the prevalent place of thought experiments in 
science textbooks and websites which aim to describe in general outline 
how this or that modern scientifi c theory works or what its content is. 
Thought experiments help students take the steps their intellectual 
ancestors took in order to understand a theory. And even if someone 
does not understand all the diffi cult theoretical structures invoked by a 
theory, they might still grasp some of the relationships between those 
structures and their previous experiences and knowledge via a thought 
experiment.
This interpretation also sheds light on the role of thought experi-
ments in scientifi c theory proliferation and “public marketing.” If a the-
ory has been developed in great theoretical or mathematical detail, but 
has not yet caught the eye of the greater scientifi c community, perhaps 
it is time to try some thought experiments. These may assist in securing 
funding and improving the theory’s public image, since granting agen-
cies and the public must be able to understand the theory to see it as 
pursuit-worthy. Late night infomercials on television encourage you to 
imagine yourself in some uncomfortable situation, from which only the 
Brand New Shining Product can save you. Thought experiments can 
also be powerful tools of advertisement that appeal to our intuitions 
and emotions via the imagination. Recognizing this power illuminates 
a new danger in thought experiments that was hidden until now: Since 
high-level understanding is one of the goals of science and thought ex-
periments can provide it, they might be used (intentionally or not) to 
deliver merely apparent and not genuine understanding. Heisenberg’s 
microscope is a potential example. While it does provide a way to visu-
alize the uncertainty principle, it has been criticized harshly for doing 
so in a misleading way (see, e.g., Roychoudhuri 1978).
This is an interesting issue, because general understanding, while 
a desideratum, might not always be achievable. Our cognitive abili-
ties might not always be suffi cient for understanding our theoretical 
structures. Perhaps it has already happened in science that we have 
abandoned a good theory for a rival that was more easily intuited and 
understood, although false. Physicist Paul Dirac “regards models, im-
ages, pictures not only as redundant, but as dangerous. As long as the 
formalism and experimental results dovetail, theoretical physics has 
achieved its task” (quoted in Yourgrau 1967: 866). The Aristotelian 
theory of motion including natural places for the fi ve elements strongly 
appeals to the imagination and is easy to understand, and this is surely 
one of the reasons it was dominant for so long. This is a problem that 
needs to be understood, and accounted for, although there is some rea-
son for optimism. It is true that once we pass into the microscopic do-
main or higher dimensions we fi nd it diffi cult to perform some kinds of 
imaginings, but this does not stop us from focusing on aspects of those 
systems that we can imagine. The entities that make up our world dis-
play a multitude of interesting properties, many of which stand in rela-
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tions that can be visualized even if others cannot. The lesson is that, 
the more complicated our theories become, the more careful we must be 
with our imaginary examples.
Finally, if thought experiments provide understanding, they serve 
a function which is indispensable for the progress of human science. 
Without understanding, we cannot use our knowledge, and without 
knowledge there is less to understand. These two features of science 
can develop independently for a while, but not for long. Even with the 
greatest division of intellectual labour, one stagnates in the absence 
of the other. According to Peter Kosso: “knowledge of many facts does 
not amount to understanding unless one also has a sense of how the 
facts fi t together” (2006: 173). He invites us to recall the Omniscienter 
from Pierre Dumal’s novel A Night of Serious Drinking, over whose 
chair it reads “I know everything, but I do not understand any of it.” 
Kosso suspects that “the Omniscienter has spent too much time gath-
ering evidence and too little time thinking about it. He has taken the 
piecemeal empiricism too seriously and overwhelmed his science with 
observation. Too many data have left too little room for understanding. 
There are examples of knowledge without understanding in the physi-
cal sciences, and they are found in the most empirically dependent sci-
ences or in any science at the time of new empirical discovery” (182).
To this end, Steven Weinberg remarks that general relativity offers 
more understanding than does quantum mechanics, because the latter 
cannot easily be bridged to our other stores of knowledge. He sees the 
Copenhagen interpretation as a surrender to the incomprehensibility 
of the theory, throwing up our hands and asking for empirical accuracy 
only (Weinberg 1992, Kosso 2006: 184). If it is true both that we need 
to understand our theories, and that quantum mechanics is inherently 
diffi cult to understand, then we should expect a great deal of thought 
experiments in quantum mechanics, especially in the fi rst decades af-
ter the theory was introduced. And indeed, this is probably the period 
most replete with thought experiments in the history of science. (See 
Peacock 2017 for a detailed look at many of them).
Many scientists explicitly seek connections between their theories 
and the world or other pieces of knowledge, which I have character-
ized above as a search for understanding. Ernst Mach remarked that 
there has to be what he called “coordination” between the variables of 
a theory and the aspects of the world to which it refers (see van Fraas-
sen 2008). The temperature reading taken from a thermometer must 
refer to something real, not to another conceptual entity. Reichenbach 
extended the problem, noticing that even the coordinating relation, if 
we could create one, would only be another abstract relation, which we 
would again need to coordinate (1965). Einstein remarked that if we 
want to talk about rigid bodies and their behaviour, we must fi rst coor-
dinate “experience[e]able objects of reality with the empty conceptual 
schemata of axiomatic geometry” (Einstein 1921). Einstein also spoke 
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of the “ever-widening logical gap between the basic concepts and laws 
on the one side and the consequences to be correlated with our experi-
ences on the other—a gap which widens progressively with the devel-
oping unifi cation of the logical structure, that is with the reduction in 
the number of the logically independent conceptual elements required 
for the basis of the whole system” (1934: 165). In other words, scientists 
recognize the need for something to bridge the gap between our theo-
retical structures, including laws, concepts, equations and mathemati-
cal models, and the world. Further, Einstein considers the possibility 
that as physics becomes more refi ned and united, it must make use of 
more and more abstract notions and relations to connect all its infor-
mation to experience.
There is evidence that scientists have intentionally used thought 
experiments to solve this problem of coordination. Heisenberg showed 
in 1925 that the matrix and wave-mechanical formalisms of quantum 
mechanics were mathematically equivalent. Still, Schrödinger was set 
on the wave mechanical interpretation, and Heisenberg on the par-
ticle interpretation. According to Marten Van Dyck, Schrödinger called 
Heisenberg’s theory a “formal theory of frightening, indeed repulsive, 
abstractness and lack of visualizability.” And “‘Heisenberg’s theory in 
its present form is not capable of any physical interpretation at all,’ 
was another claim made at the same time” (2003: 81). In response, 
Heisenberg began considering whether an interpretation focused on 
the particle nature of atomic elements could be visualized, and spe-
cifi cally whether in-principle observables could be simultaneously mea-
sured. “This was a turning point for Heisenberg’s theory, because it 
led him to propose a visualizable interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics through thought experiments based on the limits of measurement. 
Heisenberg wrote out all his ideas in a letter to Pauli at the end of 
February [1927], in an attempt, he said, to ‘get some sense of his own 
considerations’ as he groped towards a consistent theory” (Beller 1999: 
105; emphasis added). Kristian Camilleri writes, “Heisenberg’s intro-
duction of the imaginary gamma-ray microscope was not intended pri-
marily to demonstrate the limits of precision in measurement. Though 
it certainly did this, its real purpose was to defi ne the concept of posi-
tion through an operational analysis. This becomes evident once we 
situate Heisenberg’s use of imaginary gamma-ray microscope within 
the context of his concerns over the meaning of concepts in quantum 
theory” (2007: 179). Heisenberg’s thought experiment was therefore a 
way to link the new theoretical structure to some empirical content, 
whether through operationalization or visualization, for Heisenberg, in 
dialogue with his peers.
And this goes for many of the physicists of the period. Mara Beller 
writes, “most physicists, Bohr and Heisenberg included, wanted more: 
some feeling of understanding, of illuminating, or explaining the kind 
of world that quantum formalism describes. The need for this kind of 
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metaphysical grasp is not merely psychological but social as well—the 
power of a successful explanation and the power of the effective legiti-
mation and dissemination of a theory are connected” (Beller 2002: 107).
This supports the notion that the understanding provided by 
thought experiments is important for many reasons, including pedago-
gy and popularization. But more importantly, it shows that scientists 
have been aware of this, and have used thought experiments for this 
purpose.
What have we learned so far? Thought experiments have many 
epistemological uses, many of which generate understanding as op-
posed to (or in addition to) knowledge. And the imagination plays some 
role in this. How does it work? Perhaps those who characterize thought 
experiments as mental models have an answer. Nenad Miščević (2007) 
argues that the power of the imagination results from its having 
evolved as a useful predictive tool with its roots in normal perception. 
Nancy Nersessian agrees, stating that “the perceptual system plays 
a signifi cant role in imaginative thinking,” which “makes sense from 
an evolutionary perspective” (2007: 136). While Nersessian does not 
claim that all the content that is manipulated by our mental models 
is perceptual or imagistic (142), she does “contend that a wide range 
of empirical evidence shows perceptual content is retained in all kinds 
of mental representations” (139). What grounds the epistemic use of 
thought experiments for Miščević and Nersessian is experience itself, 
and the usual cognitive and sensory faculties that provide empirical 
knowledge. Perhaps their justifi cation of the outcome of thought ex-
periments through mental or neural mechanisms can also be used to 
help explain the epistemic value of thought experiments conceived as 
producing understanding. Let us examine this claim.
The idea that we manufacture complex ideas from sensory experi-
ence via reason and imagination has its modern roots in British Empir-
icism. It is still well-supported empirically (see e.g., Prinz 2002) and is 
introspectively attractive. Nevertheless, there is something about the 
use of imagination in producing scientifi c understanding that seems 
left out of such a justifi cation. The thought experiments discussed 
above do not succeed because the imagination has its roots in percep-
tion or other cognitive processes that evolved to represent the world 
accurately. We might be right to trust knowledge claims concerning 
the output of an imaginary scenario that accurately models a system 
with which we have relevant experience. But in producing new mean-
ing or new abilities, we do not need representational accuracy; we only 
need to create the right bridges between theory and experience, how-
ever that is done. And sometimes increasing representational accuracy 
would hinder rather than help. It’s hard to conceive of Maxwell’s de-
mon in a more realistic way doing the same job. Einstein’s elevator suc-
ceeds in giving content to the equivalence principle because it takes us 
away from normal perception and gives us a new means of conceiving 
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the world. Since this use of the imagination is different from the one 
that generates new knowledge, we need a different justifi cation for it.
To do this, I will set up an analogy. Just as imagination can help to 
determine the content of perception, thought experiments can help us 
to determine the content of theoretical structures.
There is support in cognitive science for the view that imagination 
can infl uence the content of perception. First, patients who have dam-
aged parts of their neocortex sometimes cannot see conceptualized ob-
jects, like, e.g., ducks. They can only see lines, shapes and patches of 
colour (Thagard 2010: 70). One explanation for this phenomenon is the 
absence in these patients of “top-down processing,” which is now “cen-
tral in modern neuroscience” (Burchard 2011: 69). Top-down processing 
occurs when we fi rst categorize or cognize things in broad strokes, and 
work through the details later. Those details are perceived as aspects 
of the more general conceptualized object, which means that the higher 
centers of our brain help to determine what we perceive. When top-
down processing is operative, higher centers in the prefrontal cortex of 
the brain track and modify what happens in lower centers. When some-
thing new or diffi cult to identify is presented to a subject, top-down 
processing starts before recognition of the object is accomplished. Ac-
cording to Miller and Cohen (2001), the prefrontal cortex accomplishes 
this by providing bias signals to lower brain structures. These bias sig-
nals guide the fl ow of neural activity along certain pathways. In other 
words, when we see something new, parts of our brain normally associ-
ated with conscious thought are already involved in categorizing and 
making sense of the thing as it is presented to us (see also Buschman 
and Miller 2007). And imaginings can certainly be conscious. For ex-
ample, it is well-known that if we approach an ambiguous fi gure (like 
the duck-rabbit of Gestalt psychology) with a certain mental image in 
mind, this can determine what we will see when we look at it. There is 
also support from the literature on “cognitive penetrability” (see e.g., 
Arstila 2017). I take all of this as evidence that the imagination, insofar 
as it is located in the higher centers of the brain, can play a constitutive 
role in determining the content of sense-experience.
Second, Mark Johnson writes in the Body in the Mind that we “con-
nect up” (1987: 152) abstract mental structures with the contents of 
our sense perception using what he calls “schemata,” which are “non-
propositional structures of imagination” (19). He says “Even our most 
simple encounters with objects, such as the perception of a cup, involve 
schemata that make it possible for us to recognize different kinds of 
things and events as being different kinds” (20). Johnson’s schemata 
have been very infl uential in cognitive science, and after the idea was 
re-expressed in Lakoff and Johnson (1999), it spawned what may be 
called a subfi eld of research. The basic idea is that through the imagi-
nation, we create schemata that give content to our beliefs, and struc-
ture perception and thought.
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Nigel Thomas, a long time researcher of mental imagery, under-
stands schemata as data structures in the brain that make possible 
our perceptual experience of the world (Thomas 1999). Thomas under-
stands schemata slightly differently from the Johnson-Lakoff school, 
but he admits that the views are compatible, and again the imagination 
plays a crucial role. Thomas argues that schemata are not things that 
we experience, although they are necessary for experience in general.
Finally, there are sources of support for the fundamentality of imag-
ination for sense experience that are more general. Stokes argues from 
a philosophical perspective that imagination is necessary (although not 
suffi cient) for the formation of new beliefs, desires, intentions, as well 
as for learning new concepts and skills (Stokes 2014: 179–180). And 
Colin McGinn (2004) argues that imagination is necessary for all cogni-
tion, since it is necessary for grasping meaning.
If we grant the possibility that imagination can structure percep-
tion in a subconscious or non-occurent way, we can begin the analogy 
to thought experiments and the theoretical structures of science. Just 
as the imagination functions at the most fundamental level with re-
spect to conceptual content, as it does for the Lakoff-Johnson school 
and Thomas, there is a sense in which we can understand the imagi-
nation playing this role at a conscious level to determine the semantic 
content of theoretical structures through thought experiments. Here, 
we occasionally use the imagination to settle on what a diffi cult new 
theoretical structure means, and in so doing, understand it by relat-
ing it to other concepts, increasing its empirical content, or becoming 
comfortable with it through repeated use. Instead of using the imagi-
nation to create a meaningful image of a duck from lines and colours 
and shapes, we use it purposely to assign new meaning to a theoretical 
structure via a thought experiment.
For Kant, the imagination is the link between the senses and the 
understanding. Every time we use a concept, we perform an action, or 
in Kant’s words, create a schema, that links a specifi c experience to our 
concept. I think something like this becomes very plausible if instead 
of linking individual sense experiences to individual categories, we 
consider linking experience as a whole (or in swaths) to the partially-
interpreted theoretical structures of scientifi c theories via uses of the 
imagination, whether consciously or unconsciously. In this case, an ac-
tion is performed, which may sometimes take the form of a thought 
experiment, which connects theoretical structures to experience. The 
thought experiment can make these structures, which are often de-
veloped in a formal or mathematical way, meaningful and fruitful. 
No amount of mathematics, laboratory experimentation or computer 
simulation will establish for us the semantic content of the principle 
of equivalence, the uncertainty principle, or Newton’s laws, because 
grasping semantic content is something we must do for ourselves, not 
something that can be done to or for us. The imagination is useful here 
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because through it we forge new connections between affective, senso-
rial, memorial and rational elements. All high level theoretical struc-
tures will require some act of semantic comprehension on our part if we 
are to make scientifi c progress by means of them, whether that act is 
prompted by a thought experiment, a simpler act of imagination, or an 
automatic act of imaginative association. And this act of schematiza-
tion, which would be described by Kant, Johnson, Lakoff and Thomas 
as an act of imagination, cannot be justifi ed by cognitive science or by 
philosophy. It is only justifi ed in a transcendental sense because it is 
always necessarily presupposed by both. That is why it is a sine qua 
non of scientifi c understanding.
I hope this characterization of the role of the imagination in thought 
experiments sheds some light on the common conclusions of the empiri-
cal studies I considered above, namely, that thought experiments in-
crease scientifi c understanding by bridging theoretical structures with 
existing knowledge or experience. Of course, there are different kinds 
of understanding thought experiments can produce. These are distin-
guished elsewhere (see Stuart 2017). There are also different kinds of 
imagination that are important for the discussion. In this paper, I con-
sidered imagination as an ability (or faculty, capacity); in future work 
I will turn to imaginative processes (actions or practices), which can be 
thought of as exercises of our ability to imagine. Unlike the imagina-
tive faculty, imaginative acts can be discussed in a non-transcendental 
way. That is, we can say directly what makes different imaginative 
acts epistemically valuable. But at the level of generality I’ve taken up 
in this paper by discussing the faculty of imagination, we can only give 
something like a transcendental justifi cation. In this, I follow Marco 
Buzzoni, on whose work I have drawn extensively (see Buzzoni 2008, 
2013, 2016, 2017). Speaking in Buzzoni’s terms, this paper takes up the 
transcendental perspective on thought experiments, where in future 
work I will be taking up what he calls the operational perspective.
To conclude, in the cases considered above where novel understand-
ing is produced, it is often due to creating a connection between some 
theoretical structure(s) of science and existing knowledge, skills or ex-
perience, via an exercise of the imagination. We have substantiated 
this idea by considering the imagination as a key component in build-
ing these bridges. Thought experiments are instances of the sort of 
conceptual exploration that is needed to understand theoretical struc-
tures in science, which are themselves a necessary condition for the 
possibility of a working science. This argument, that thought experi-
ments increase understanding by means of the imagination, which is 
fundamental to all theoretical understanding, suggests a novel way to 
justify the role of the imagination in creating scientifi c understanding, 
one that does not confl ict with any of the existing accounts that aim to 
justify empirical knowledge produced by thought experiments.
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